Judicial politics: Justice suffers when judges lobby legislators
Colorado's judicial branch influences legislators about what judges want; not what justice requires
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You're led to believe that there are no politics in Colorado's judiciary because Colorado does not have contested elections for judges. Yet Colorado's judicial nominating commissions are politically imbalanced and filled with Republicans and Democrats. The members of the performance commissions are appointed by political leaders. And the judicial branch regularly lobbies the legislature regarding laws to be made as opposed to just hearing cases.
Make no mistake about it, Colorado did not remove politics from its judiciary when it turned its back on contested elections in 1967. Colorado simply put the politics in the closet. Worse yet, Colorado turned its judicial branch into an improper, powerful political lobby. The judicial branch has a full-time "legislative liaison" whose job is to keep tabs on the legislature and pursue legislation. Legislators often consult with the liaison before voting on legislation. Colorado's judicial branch has a hand in forming public policy at the legislature long before cases wind their way into the court system. Colorado abandoned contested elections for judges decades ago, but neglected to take politics out of the judiciary altogether. Colorado created a dangerous hybrid where judges don't run in contested elections, aren't labeled as Republican or Democrat, yet have great sway with term-limited legislators and governors to create statewide public policy that often benefits judges but doesn't benefit justice. |
The view of the Colorado state capitol from the Supreme Court building
When judges advocate for legislative policies, judges are advocating for what judges want. When judges advocate for or against proposed laws of any kind, judges bring into question their ability to fairly determine a case. When judges argue for policies that undermine the judicial process, one has to wonder about justice itself. Over and over again, Colorado's judicial branch has lobbied for and obtained laws that undermine Colorado's justice system.
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Judicial branch circumvents constitutional judicial selection methods.
Everyone should have the right to a judge who is selected, disciplined and retained in the same manner. Colorado's judicial branch touts its judicial selection process as an excellent example of how to select the best judges. But the judicial branch has repeatedly lobbied for, and obtained, the creation of judicial positions that are excepted from the nomination/appointment/retention process. If Colorado's judicial selection process is so wonderful, why is it circumvented so regularly?
Three types of judges were created to avoid the judicial retention elections and/or the nomination/appointment process. The positions were created because the judicial branch wanted to lighten the workload of judges who are subject to Colorado's constitutional judicial selection methods. The result is that judges got what they wanted -- less work. But the people are deprived of the right to vote against the individuals in a retention election. Everyone is entitled to a judge who is accountable to the people. None of the positions below are accountable to the people.
Magistrates are hired by district court judges and serve at the pleasure of district court judges. Magistrates don't go through retention elections. Magistrates do not go through performance evaluations. Colorado's Commission on Judicial Discipline does not have jurisdiction over magistrates. Yet magistrates can sentence people to jail. If a magistrate can sentence you to jail, you should be able to vote for or against that magistrate in a retention election.
Administrative Law Judges are state employees hired like any other employee in the executive branch. Yet such judges rule over workers' compensation, human services, licensing and a variety of other cases. Workers' compensation cases in particular involve litigation between private parties. Administrative law judges are not subject to Colorado's Commission on Judicial Discipline. They do not go through performance evaluations by performance commissions. A legislator tried in 1996 to move the administrative law judges into the judicial branch where they would be subject to Colorado's nomination/appointment/retention process. The judicial branch went on the legislative record saying "we don't want the work." The judicial branch was successful in keeping the judges out of the judicial branch. Colorado is the only state that selects and retains administrative law judges in the manner that it does. In opposing judges in the judicial branch, the judicial branch undermined the value and integrity of Colorado's judicial branch.
Retired judges, who are often referred to as senior judges, are allowed to return after they leave the bench. Although they originally were selected for the bench, they no longer go through retention elections and aren't subject to Colorado's judicial performance commissions. In some situations, the judge may have retired because he or she was facing discipline, although we wouldn't know because judicial discipline proceedings are confidential in Colorado. The existence of retired judges shows that Colorado sometimes has lifetime appointments to the bench. Retired judges often preside over jury trials, sentence people to jail, and at the Court of Appeals, make statewide public policy. Worse yet, the state court administrator and the chief justice of the Supreme Court hand-select which judges can participate in the senior judge program. They place their choice judges under contract. Then the state court administrator and/or the chief justice can put that particular retired judge on any particular case or on any panel at the Court of Appeals. The involvement of a retired judge in any case in Colorado gives rise to an appearance of impropriety.
When Colorado's judicial branch lobbied for the above exceptions to Colorado's judicial selection process, the judicial branch brought the value of the nomination/appointment/retention process into question. Why do some people get judges subject to the nomination/appointment/retention process and some people don't? And imagine the problem of challenging any of these entities in a court case in Colorado's judicial branch. Because the judicial branch lobbied for the creation of these positions, it is difficult for anyone to believe that Colorado's judicial branch could fairly determine a challenge to magistrates, administrative law judges or retired judges. If Colorado's judicial branch is to improve the public's confidence in its judgments, it needs to stop playing politics.
Three types of judges were created to avoid the judicial retention elections and/or the nomination/appointment process. The positions were created because the judicial branch wanted to lighten the workload of judges who are subject to Colorado's constitutional judicial selection methods. The result is that judges got what they wanted -- less work. But the people are deprived of the right to vote against the individuals in a retention election. Everyone is entitled to a judge who is accountable to the people. None of the positions below are accountable to the people.
Magistrates are hired by district court judges and serve at the pleasure of district court judges. Magistrates don't go through retention elections. Magistrates do not go through performance evaluations. Colorado's Commission on Judicial Discipline does not have jurisdiction over magistrates. Yet magistrates can sentence people to jail. If a magistrate can sentence you to jail, you should be able to vote for or against that magistrate in a retention election.
Administrative Law Judges are state employees hired like any other employee in the executive branch. Yet such judges rule over workers' compensation, human services, licensing and a variety of other cases. Workers' compensation cases in particular involve litigation between private parties. Administrative law judges are not subject to Colorado's Commission on Judicial Discipline. They do not go through performance evaluations by performance commissions. A legislator tried in 1996 to move the administrative law judges into the judicial branch where they would be subject to Colorado's nomination/appointment/retention process. The judicial branch went on the legislative record saying "we don't want the work." The judicial branch was successful in keeping the judges out of the judicial branch. Colorado is the only state that selects and retains administrative law judges in the manner that it does. In opposing judges in the judicial branch, the judicial branch undermined the value and integrity of Colorado's judicial branch.
Retired judges, who are often referred to as senior judges, are allowed to return after they leave the bench. Although they originally were selected for the bench, they no longer go through retention elections and aren't subject to Colorado's judicial performance commissions. In some situations, the judge may have retired because he or she was facing discipline, although we wouldn't know because judicial discipline proceedings are confidential in Colorado. The existence of retired judges shows that Colorado sometimes has lifetime appointments to the bench. Retired judges often preside over jury trials, sentence people to jail, and at the Court of Appeals, make statewide public policy. Worse yet, the state court administrator and the chief justice of the Supreme Court hand-select which judges can participate in the senior judge program. They place their choice judges under contract. Then the state court administrator and/or the chief justice can put that particular retired judge on any particular case or on any panel at the Court of Appeals. The involvement of a retired judge in any case in Colorado gives rise to an appearance of impropriety.
When Colorado's judicial branch lobbied for the above exceptions to Colorado's judicial selection process, the judicial branch brought the value of the nomination/appointment/retention process into question. Why do some people get judges subject to the nomination/appointment/retention process and some people don't? And imagine the problem of challenging any of these entities in a court case in Colorado's judicial branch. Because the judicial branch lobbied for the creation of these positions, it is difficult for anyone to believe that Colorado's judicial branch could fairly determine a challenge to magistrates, administrative law judges or retired judges. If Colorado's judicial branch is to improve the public's confidence in its judgments, it needs to stop playing politics.
Justice is not random in Colorado.
In order to be trustworthy, the assignment of judges should be random. Colorado, however, has laws that allow specific judges to be assigned to specific cases all across the state. And an un-elected state official often gets to select the judge who hears any particular case.
This problem is especially pronounced at the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals has 22 judges on the court and each case is heard by a panel of three judges. The chief judge of the Court of Appeals has the power to specifically assign any of those 22 judges to any case. In addition, the state court administrator, with the chief justice of the Supreme Court, can assign any retired judge to any case at the Court of Appeals or to any other court. The number of senior judges under contract at the Court of Appeals is not in the same proportion as it is in trial courts. In other words, the chances of getting a specifically-assigned senior judge is much higher at the Court of Appeals. The result is that the state court administrator and the chief justice have complete control over who determines the outcome of cases involving statewide public policy at the Court of Appeals.
This all came to fruition in a case involving administrative law judges, who are located in the executive branch and not the judicial branch. As stated above, the judicial branch went on the legislative record in 1996 opposing administrative law judges in the judicial branch. The judicial branch representative said the chief justice told her to tell the legislature that, "we don't want the work." The bill that would have placed administrative law judges in the judicial branch, and subject to Colorado's nomination/appointment/retention process, failed. Then administrative law judges were challenged in a court case. Dee Enterprises v. ICAO, 89 P.3d 430 (Colo. App. 2003). A panel of judges was specifically concocted to hear the Dee Enterprises case. The Court of Appeals panel included two retired judges and the chief judge of the Court of Appeals. The only way retired judges can hear a case in Colorado is if they are specifically assigned to the case.
Not surprisingly, the panel of judges who were individually and specifically assigned to the Dee Enterprises case at the Court of Appeals came to a determination in line with the judicial branch's desires, ruling that administrative law judges do not need to be in Colorado's judicial branch subject to Colorado's nomination/appointment/retention process.
This problem is especially pronounced at the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals has 22 judges on the court and each case is heard by a panel of three judges. The chief judge of the Court of Appeals has the power to specifically assign any of those 22 judges to any case. In addition, the state court administrator, with the chief justice of the Supreme Court, can assign any retired judge to any case at the Court of Appeals or to any other court. The number of senior judges under contract at the Court of Appeals is not in the same proportion as it is in trial courts. In other words, the chances of getting a specifically-assigned senior judge is much higher at the Court of Appeals. The result is that the state court administrator and the chief justice have complete control over who determines the outcome of cases involving statewide public policy at the Court of Appeals.
This all came to fruition in a case involving administrative law judges, who are located in the executive branch and not the judicial branch. As stated above, the judicial branch went on the legislative record in 1996 opposing administrative law judges in the judicial branch. The judicial branch representative said the chief justice told her to tell the legislature that, "we don't want the work." The bill that would have placed administrative law judges in the judicial branch, and subject to Colorado's nomination/appointment/retention process, failed. Then administrative law judges were challenged in a court case. Dee Enterprises v. ICAO, 89 P.3d 430 (Colo. App. 2003). A panel of judges was specifically concocted to hear the Dee Enterprises case. The Court of Appeals panel included two retired judges and the chief judge of the Court of Appeals. The only way retired judges can hear a case in Colorado is if they are specifically assigned to the case.
Not surprisingly, the panel of judges who were individually and specifically assigned to the Dee Enterprises case at the Court of Appeals came to a determination in line with the judicial branch's desires, ruling that administrative law judges do not need to be in Colorado's judicial branch subject to Colorado's nomination/appointment/retention process.
State court administrator: A position mired in scandal.
Colorado's state court administrator is not an elected official. The position was created in a statute lobbied for by the judicial branch and adopted by the legislature. He's a judicial branch employee hired by the Supreme Court. He's not accountable to voters. Yet he oversees the judicial branch's annual budget that exceeds a half billion dollars, most of which is funded with taxpayer money. And he has the power to put the judge he wants on a lot of cases in Colorado, particularly at the Court of Appeals where public policy is made.
In order to get the Ralph L. Carr Justice Complex built in downtown Denver, then State Court Administrator Gerald Marroney told legislators and the public in 2008 that no tax dollars would be used to pay for the building. He stated that the judicial branch would generate the revenue to pay for the building. The statements were made to convince legislators to support the bill that created the complex.
The statements convinced legislators, but the statements weren't accurate. As subsequent events have shown, the legislature has repeatedly had to use millions of taxpayer dollars to cover the debt for the building. Year after year. The only question is how much taxpayers will ultimately end up paying. The lease-purchase agreement doesn't end until 2046. Right now, Colorado's taxpayers are on track to pay $128 million for the building legislators were duped into approving by Marroney's statements that no tax payer dollars would be used.
After Marroney retired, the Supreme Court searched for a new administrator. Many people applied and the judicial branch claimed to have a nationwide search. Yet the Supreme Court hired Christopher Ryan, a long time judicial branch employee who climbed the judicial branch's corporate ladder to become the clerk for the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. He did not have a master's degree in business administration.
In 2019, Ryan resigned the day after he cancelled a $2.5 million contract he awarded to a former judicial branch employee who had been recently disciplined for falsifying receipts. The Denver Post investigated and reported the story.
The employee who falsified receipts had been hired by Ryan to provide leadership training to judges and judicial administrative officials.
Ryan was also responsible for hiring retired judges, placing them under contract, and assigning them to cases. Were any of those contracts improperly awarded as well?
After Ryan resigned, the Supreme Court again searched for a state court administrator. Another current employee, Steven Vasconcellos, was hired to replace Ryan. Vasconcellas served under both Ryan and Marroney.
Should Colorado allow the Supreme Court to simply hire a state court administrator? Should Colorado let the public determine who serves as the state court administrator via a contested election? Should Colorado allow the state court administrator to select what judges hear certain cases? Should Colorado allow the state court administrator to place certain retired judges under contract to hear and determine cases? It would seem that history shows the position of state court administrator has often undermined the public's confidence in the judiciary.
The state court administrator and all judges in the judicial branch are protected by the rule the Supreme Court adopted excepting itself from Colorado's Open Records Act. If the release of information about the state court administrator could (speculative) compromise his safety or security, the judicial branch doesn't have to release the information.
In order to get the Ralph L. Carr Justice Complex built in downtown Denver, then State Court Administrator Gerald Marroney told legislators and the public in 2008 that no tax dollars would be used to pay for the building. He stated that the judicial branch would generate the revenue to pay for the building. The statements were made to convince legislators to support the bill that created the complex.
The statements convinced legislators, but the statements weren't accurate. As subsequent events have shown, the legislature has repeatedly had to use millions of taxpayer dollars to cover the debt for the building. Year after year. The only question is how much taxpayers will ultimately end up paying. The lease-purchase agreement doesn't end until 2046. Right now, Colorado's taxpayers are on track to pay $128 million for the building legislators were duped into approving by Marroney's statements that no tax payer dollars would be used.
After Marroney retired, the Supreme Court searched for a new administrator. Many people applied and the judicial branch claimed to have a nationwide search. Yet the Supreme Court hired Christopher Ryan, a long time judicial branch employee who climbed the judicial branch's corporate ladder to become the clerk for the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. He did not have a master's degree in business administration.
In 2019, Ryan resigned the day after he cancelled a $2.5 million contract he awarded to a former judicial branch employee who had been recently disciplined for falsifying receipts. The Denver Post investigated and reported the story.
The employee who falsified receipts had been hired by Ryan to provide leadership training to judges and judicial administrative officials.
Ryan was also responsible for hiring retired judges, placing them under contract, and assigning them to cases. Were any of those contracts improperly awarded as well?
After Ryan resigned, the Supreme Court again searched for a state court administrator. Another current employee, Steven Vasconcellos, was hired to replace Ryan. Vasconcellas served under both Ryan and Marroney.
Should Colorado allow the Supreme Court to simply hire a state court administrator? Should Colorado let the public determine who serves as the state court administrator via a contested election? Should Colorado allow the state court administrator to select what judges hear certain cases? Should Colorado allow the state court administrator to place certain retired judges under contract to hear and determine cases? It would seem that history shows the position of state court administrator has often undermined the public's confidence in the judiciary.
The state court administrator and all judges in the judicial branch are protected by the rule the Supreme Court adopted excepting itself from Colorado's Open Records Act. If the release of information about the state court administrator could (speculative) compromise his safety or security, the judicial branch doesn't have to release the information.
Judges determine Colorado's Open Records Act doesn't apply to them.
Although Colorado has an Open Records Act that applies "all writings made, maintained, or kept by the state, any agency, institution, . . . or political subdivision of the state, . . .," the Colorado Supreme Court determined that the Open Records Act does not apply to the judicial branch because the legislature didn't make it clear that the judicial branch is an agency of the state. Office of the State Ct. Adm'r v. Background Info. Serv., 994 P.2d 420 (Colo. 1999). The opinion was written by Rebecca Kourlis who ultimately left the bench and formed the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System (IAALS) at Denver University, an organization created to be supportive of judges.
The opinion paved the way for a Supreme Court rule that allows the judicial branch to keep documents secret if such "inspections could compromise the safety or security of a Judicial Branch employee." Where the legislature focused on the public interest in adopting Colorado's Open Records Act, the judicial branch focused on itself in adopting its rule. The judicial branch's rule is an example of a completely selfish power play -- an example of what happens when a conflict of interest is present. The rule constitutes improper legislation by the judicial branch that completely benefits the judges and other employees in the judicial branch. If the judicial branch doesn't want you to see a document, you're not going to see the document. Any administrative records regarding a judge can be kept from public view.
Legislators have unsuccessfully attempted to make judicial branch records public. When such legislation was being considered, a Supreme Court justice, Monica Marquez, testified in legislative hearings that the legislature should not adopt a bill making judicial branch records public. It was yet another example of the judicial branch improperly playing politics.
The Colorado legislature has allowed the judicial branch to hold on to its ruling allowing the judicial branch to keep a multitude of records in the dark. Interestingly enough, bills in the legislature regarding judicial branch records and the Open Records Act have often been determined along party lines. Democrats have sided with the Supreme Court and Republicans have argued that judicial branch records should be open. It is important to note that Colorado has had mostly Democrat governors in recent years and, in particular, most seats on Colorado's Supreme Court have been appointed by a governor who was a Democrat.
According to the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are supposed to avoid the appearance of impropriety and promote confidence in the judiciary. Did Colorado's Supreme Court promote your confidence in the judiciary when it ruled that the Open Records Act does not apply to judges? Did Supreme Court Justice Monica Marquez promote your confidence in the judiciary when she lobbied the legislature to let the Supreme Court's opinion stand? One thing we do know is that the judicial branch-- the branch of government that is supposed to be the fairest of all -- is the darkest of all.
The opinion paved the way for a Supreme Court rule that allows the judicial branch to keep documents secret if such "inspections could compromise the safety or security of a Judicial Branch employee." Where the legislature focused on the public interest in adopting Colorado's Open Records Act, the judicial branch focused on itself in adopting its rule. The judicial branch's rule is an example of a completely selfish power play -- an example of what happens when a conflict of interest is present. The rule constitutes improper legislation by the judicial branch that completely benefits the judges and other employees in the judicial branch. If the judicial branch doesn't want you to see a document, you're not going to see the document. Any administrative records regarding a judge can be kept from public view.
Legislators have unsuccessfully attempted to make judicial branch records public. When such legislation was being considered, a Supreme Court justice, Monica Marquez, testified in legislative hearings that the legislature should not adopt a bill making judicial branch records public. It was yet another example of the judicial branch improperly playing politics.
The Colorado legislature has allowed the judicial branch to hold on to its ruling allowing the judicial branch to keep a multitude of records in the dark. Interestingly enough, bills in the legislature regarding judicial branch records and the Open Records Act have often been determined along party lines. Democrats have sided with the Supreme Court and Republicans have argued that judicial branch records should be open. It is important to note that Colorado has had mostly Democrat governors in recent years and, in particular, most seats on Colorado's Supreme Court have been appointed by a governor who was a Democrat.
According to the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are supposed to avoid the appearance of impropriety and promote confidence in the judiciary. Did Colorado's Supreme Court promote your confidence in the judiciary when it ruled that the Open Records Act does not apply to judges? Did Supreme Court Justice Monica Marquez promote your confidence in the judiciary when she lobbied the legislature to let the Supreme Court's opinion stand? One thing we do know is that the judicial branch-- the branch of government that is supposed to be the fairest of all -- is the darkest of all.
Legislators get special treatment in Colorado's judicial branch.
The idea behind having three branches of government is that they keep checks and balances on each other. In Colorado, two of the branches have term-limited officials -- the executive and legislative branches. The judges in Colorado's judicial branch are not term limited. The judicial branch knows very well how to work the legislature to get what the judicial branch wants.
Legislators have perks that average individuals don't have. This was revealed in the statements of State Senator Bob Gardner (Colorado Springs) at a joint Judiciary hearing at the state capitol. Gardner related how he solved a problem on a case involving a colleague by simply making a call to the state court administrator.
“Having had about 5 or 6 years ago a colleague with whom I shared an office come to me and say, ‘I’m appearing in front of this senior judge and the senior judge said this’ and then she showed me the transcript and she said ‘and I don’t know what to do but I understand you’re in the legislature’ and so forth. Well, I was able to make a phone call to the state court administrator. But had my colleague not shared office space with a member of the House Judiciary Committee she would have been faced with a recusal motion . . .”
-- Senator Bob Gardner, 1/25/19 joint Judiciary hearing
When legislators can get what they want with a phone call, why would they want to change the system? Although changing the system would benefit you, it wouldn't necessarily benefit legislators. The phone call Gardner made was to the un-elected state court administrator who has the power to assign, or un-assign, a retired judge to any case in Colorado.
Gardner's statement on the public record shows the need for judicial reform. Colorado's judicial branch knows how to treat legislators so legislators keep attempts for judicial reform at bay. The judicial branch knows what legislators want and need. And the judicial branch is not afraid to fulfill those desires as long as it suits the agenda of the judicial branch.
Legislators have perks that average individuals don't have. This was revealed in the statements of State Senator Bob Gardner (Colorado Springs) at a joint Judiciary hearing at the state capitol. Gardner related how he solved a problem on a case involving a colleague by simply making a call to the state court administrator.
“Having had about 5 or 6 years ago a colleague with whom I shared an office come to me and say, ‘I’m appearing in front of this senior judge and the senior judge said this’ and then she showed me the transcript and she said ‘and I don’t know what to do but I understand you’re in the legislature’ and so forth. Well, I was able to make a phone call to the state court administrator. But had my colleague not shared office space with a member of the House Judiciary Committee she would have been faced with a recusal motion . . .”
-- Senator Bob Gardner, 1/25/19 joint Judiciary hearing
When legislators can get what they want with a phone call, why would they want to change the system? Although changing the system would benefit you, it wouldn't necessarily benefit legislators. The phone call Gardner made was to the un-elected state court administrator who has the power to assign, or un-assign, a retired judge to any case in Colorado.
Gardner's statement on the public record shows the need for judicial reform. Colorado's judicial branch knows how to treat legislators so legislators keep attempts for judicial reform at bay. The judicial branch knows what legislators want and need. And the judicial branch is not afraid to fulfill those desires as long as it suits the agenda of the judicial branch.
Judges maintain memberships in organizations that lobby legislators.
Many people don't realize that judges are members of the Colorado Bar Association. Unlike most other states, membership in Colorado's Bar Association is not mandatory. The Colorado Bar Association is simply a private group to which lawyers and others can belong. Many lawyers actually do not maintain a membership in the Colorado Bar Association. Judges, however, often have prominent roles in the Colorado Bar Association where they can have great influence over the organization.
The Colorado Bar Association often lobbies the legislature regarding bills before the legislature. The Colorado Bar Association has consistently lobbied against any sort of judicial reform. It must be understood, however, that the political stances on proposed legislation are not based on a vote by the membership of the Colorado Bar Association. The association gave its executive council primary control over the organization years ago. And the political positions of the organization are determined by an insular legislative policy committee.
Term-limited legislators often don't understand the intricacies of the Colorado Bar Association. Such legislators are improperly influenced by an organization that includes judges and has a legislative policy committee that is heavily influenced by Colorado's judicial branch. Most people would think a position of the Colorado Bar Association is the position of the lawyers across the state. Such is not the case.
Another organization that lobbies the legislature, and includes judges as its members, is the Colorado Judicial Institute. The institute started out as merely a group to protect Colorado's nomination/appointment/retention process. The institute claimed it wanted to avoid politics in Colorado's judiciary. The institute has changed over the years and now is basically an organization that advocates for what judges want. The organization is filled with judges and those who want to get in the good graces of those judges. The organization lobbies the legislature and has consistently lobbied against any judicial reform efforts.
Both the Colorado Bar Association and the Colorado Judicial Institute want to keep Colorado's judicial branch in the dark. The organizations are focused on keeping the status quo and opposing any efforts to improve the justice system. Both organizations have lobbied against making judicial discipline proceedings public in Colorado. Given that most states have public judicial discipline proceedings, one would have to consider the stances of these organizations to be radical.
The primary fundraiser for the Colorado Judicial Institute is actually one of the legal system's lowest ethical points in any given year. The institute sells seats to a dinner where the participants get to sit close to judges. The higher amount of the money paid, the more potential influence you have over any judge. It's been referred to as the "Wanna buy a judge?" event. If there were more enforcement of the Code of Judicial Conduct in Colorado, the event probably wouldn't even be allowed. But the event helps to fund the legislative agenda of Colorado judges.
The Colorado Bar Association often lobbies the legislature regarding bills before the legislature. The Colorado Bar Association has consistently lobbied against any sort of judicial reform. It must be understood, however, that the political stances on proposed legislation are not based on a vote by the membership of the Colorado Bar Association. The association gave its executive council primary control over the organization years ago. And the political positions of the organization are determined by an insular legislative policy committee.
Term-limited legislators often don't understand the intricacies of the Colorado Bar Association. Such legislators are improperly influenced by an organization that includes judges and has a legislative policy committee that is heavily influenced by Colorado's judicial branch. Most people would think a position of the Colorado Bar Association is the position of the lawyers across the state. Such is not the case.
Another organization that lobbies the legislature, and includes judges as its members, is the Colorado Judicial Institute. The institute started out as merely a group to protect Colorado's nomination/appointment/retention process. The institute claimed it wanted to avoid politics in Colorado's judiciary. The institute has changed over the years and now is basically an organization that advocates for what judges want. The organization is filled with judges and those who want to get in the good graces of those judges. The organization lobbies the legislature and has consistently lobbied against any judicial reform efforts.
Both the Colorado Bar Association and the Colorado Judicial Institute want to keep Colorado's judicial branch in the dark. The organizations are focused on keeping the status quo and opposing any efforts to improve the justice system. Both organizations have lobbied against making judicial discipline proceedings public in Colorado. Given that most states have public judicial discipline proceedings, one would have to consider the stances of these organizations to be radical.
The primary fundraiser for the Colorado Judicial Institute is actually one of the legal system's lowest ethical points in any given year. The institute sells seats to a dinner where the participants get to sit close to judges. The higher amount of the money paid, the more potential influence you have over any judge. It's been referred to as the "Wanna buy a judge?" event. If there were more enforcement of the Code of Judicial Conduct in Colorado, the event probably wouldn't even be allowed. But the event helps to fund the legislative agenda of Colorado judges.
Colorado needs judicial reform.
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Judicial politics undermine judicial integrity. Colorado abandoned contested elections for judges years ago. The politics, however, remain. The result is a judicial branch that has lost its focus on justice. Judges need to be limited to hearing and deciding cases. The policy-making should be left to the legislature without improper influence from the judicial branch.
Everyone in Colorado is entitled to a fair and impartial judge. Yet Colorado's dark system treats various people differently. Colorado's judges have shown over time that they are more interested in helping and protecting themselves than ensuring justice for all. When judges advocate for what judges want, the justice system suffers. We need to change the system. We need to remove the politics from Colorado's judicial branch. We need to restore the focus on judicial ethics. We want judges to have one priority: Being good judges. Please support our efforts to increase transparency, enhance accountability and remove conflicts of interest in Colorado's judicial branch. Justice should be blind. Please sign our petition or follow us on Facebook. |
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